BOOK I PART III
number of views. Or,secondly, That it runs
into the other similar and correspondent views,
and gives them a superior degree of force and
vivacity. But that the first hypothesis is erro-
neous, is evident from experience, which in-
forms us, that the belief, attending any reason-
ing, consists in one conclusion, not in a mul-
titude of similar ones, which would only dis-
tract the mind, and in many cases would be
too numerous to be comprehended distinctly
by any finite capacity. It remains, therefore, as
the only reasonable opinion, that these simi-
lar views run into each other, and unite their
forces; so as to produce a stronger and clearer
view, than what arises from any one alone. This
is the manner, in which past experiments con-
cur, when they are transfered to any future
event. As to the manner of their opposition,
it is evident, that as the contrary views are in-