BOOK I PART III
What principally gives authority to this sys-
tem is, beside the undoubted arguments, upon
which each part is founded, the agreement of
these parts, and the necessity of one to explain
another. The belief, which attends our mem-
ory, is of the same nature with that, which is
derived from our judgments: Nor is there any
difference betwixt that judgment, which is de-
rived from a constant and uniform connexion
of causes and effects, and that which depends
upon an interrupted and uncertain. It is indeed
evident, that in all determinations, where the
mind decides from contrary experiments, it is
first divided within itself, and has an inclina-
tion to either side in proportion to the num-
ber of experiments we have seen and remem-
ber. This contest is at last determined to the
advantage of that side, where we observe a su-
perior number of these experiments; but still