BOOK I PART IV
forcible conception on the one side, than on the
other. This strong conception forms my first
decision. I suppose, that afterwards I exam-
ine my judgment itself, and observing from ex-
perience, that it is sometimes just and some-
times erroneous, I consider it as regulated by
contrary principles or causes, of which some
lead to truth, and some to error; and in bal-
lancing these contrary causes, I diminish by a
new probability the assurance of my first deci-
sion. This new probability is liable to the same
diminution as the foregoing, and so on,in in-
finitum. It is therefore demanded, how it hap-
pens, that even after all we retain a degree of
belief, which is sufficient for our purpose, ei-
ther in philosophy or common life.
I answer, that after the first and second deci-
sion; as the action of the mind becomes forced