BOOK I PART IV
appear. Every thing that enters the mind, be-
ing in reality a perception, it is impossible any
thing should to feeling appear different. This
were to suppose, that even where we are most
intimately conscious, we might be mistaken.
But not to lose time in examining, whether
it is possible for our senses to deceive us, and
represent our perceptions as distinct from our-
selves, that is as external to and independent
of us; let us consider whether they really do so,
and whether this error proceeds from an imme-
diate sensation, or from some other causes.
To begin with the question concerningex-
ternalexistence, it may perhaps be said, that
setting aside the metaphysical question of the
identity of a thinking substance, our own body
evidently belongs to us; and as several im-
pressions appear exterior to the body, we sup-