BOOK I PART IV
gar only regard the second as on the same foot-
ing. Both philosophers and the vulgar, again,
esteem the third to be merely perceptions and
consequently interrupted and dependent be-
ings.
Now it is evident, that, whatever may be our
philosophical opinion, colours, Sounds, heat
and cold, as far as appears to the senses, ex-
ist after the same manner with motion and
solidity, and that the difference we make be-
twixt them in this respect, arises not from the
mere perception. So strong the prejudice for
the distinct continued existence Of the former
qualities, that when the contrary opinion is ad-
vanced by modern philosophers, people imag-
ine they can almost refute it from their feeling
and experience, and that their very senses con-
tradict this philosophy. It is also evident, that