BOOK I PART IV
out anyvariationorinterruptionin the object; in
which case it gives us the idea of unity. Here
then is an idea, which is a medium betwixt
unity and number; or more properly speak-
ing, is either of them, according to the view, in
which we take it: And this idea we call that of
identity. We cannot, in any propriety of speech,
say, that an object is the same with itself, unless
we mean, that the object existent at one time is
the same with itself existent at another. By this
means we make a difference, betwixt the idea
meant by the word,object, and that meant by
itself, without going the length of number, and
at the same time without restraining ourselves
to a strict and absolute unity.
Thus the principle of individuation is noth-
ing but theinvariablenessanduninterruptedness
of any object, thro a supposd variation of time,