BOOK I PART IV
The persons, who entertain this opinion con-
cerning the identity of our resembling percep-
tions, are in general an the unthinking and un-
philosophical part of mankind, (that is, all of
us, at one time or other) and consequently such
as suppose their perceptions to be their only
objects, and never think of a double existence
internal and external, representing and repre-
sented. The very image, which is present to
the senses, is with us the real body; and it is to
contribute to our mistaking the succession of our inter-
rupted perceptions for an identical object. The first is,
the resemblance of the perceptions: The second is the
resemblance, which the act of the mind in surveying a
succession of resembling objects bears to that in survey-
ing an identical object. Now these resemblances we are
apt to confound with each other; and it is natural we
shoud, according to this very reasoning. But let us keep
them distinct, and we shall find no difficulty in conceiv-
ing the precedent argument.