BOOK I PART IV
trine of the independent existence of our sensi-
ble perceptions is contrary to the plainest expe-
rience. This leads us backward upon our foot-
steps to perceive our error in attributing a con-
tinued existence to our perceptions, and is the
origin of many very curious opinions, which
we shall here endeavour to account for.
It will first be proper to observe a few of
those experiments, which convince us, that our
perceptions are not possest of any independent
existence. When we press one eye with a fin-
ger, we immediately perceive all the objects to
become double, and one half of them to be re-
moved from their common and natural posi-
tion. But as we do not attribute to continued
existence to both these perceptions, and as they
are both of the same nature, we clearly per-
ceive, that all our perceptions are dependent on