BOOK I PART IV
has all the conditions it desires. Were we fully
convinced, that our resembling perceptions are
continued, and identical, and independent, we
should never run into this opinion of a double
existence, since we should find satisfaction in
our first supposition, and would not look be-
yond. Again, were we fully convinced, that our
perceptions are dependent, and interrupted,
and different, we should be as little inclined
to embrace the opinion of a double existence;
since in that case we should clearly perceive the
error of our first supposition of a continued ex-
istence, and would never regard it any farther.
It is therefore from the intermediate situation
of the mind, that this opinion arises, and from
such an adherence to these two contrary prin-
ciples, as makes us seek some pretext to jus-
tify our receiving both; which happily at last
is found in the system of a double existence.