BOOK I PART IV
manner, as if perfectly uncompounded. But the
mind rests not here. Whenever it views the ob-
ject in another light, it finds that all these quali-
ties are different, and distinguishable, and sep-
arable from each other; which view of things
being destructive of its primary and more nat-
ural notions, obliges the imagination to feign
an unknown something, or original substance
and matter, as a principle of union or cohesion
among these qualities, and as what may give
the compound object a title to be called one
thing, notwithstanding its diversity and com-
position.
The peripatetic philosophy asserts the origi-
nal matter to be perfectly homogeneous in all
bodies, and considers fire, water, earth, and
air, as of the very same substance; on account
of their gradual revolutions and changes into