BOOK I PART IV
sive to every one that comprehends it; but be-
cause it may seem abstruse and intricate to the
generality of readers, I hope to be excused, if I
endeavour to render it more obvious by some
variation of the expression. In order to form
an idea of solidity, we must conceive two bod-
ies pressing on each other without any pene-
tration; and it is impossible to arrive at this
idea, when we confine ourselves to one object,
much more without conceiving any. Two non-
entities cannot exclude each other from their
places; because they never possess any place,
nor can be endowed with any quality. Now
I ask, what idea do we form of these bodies
or objects, to which we suppose solidity to be-
long? To say, that we conceive them merely as
solid, is to run on in infinitum. To affirm, that
we paint them out to ourselves as extended, ei-
ther resolves all into a false idea, or returns in