BOOK I PART IV
for the immateriality of the soul, which seems
to me remarkable. Whatever is extended con-
sists of parts; and whatever consists of parts is
divisible, if not in reality, at least in the imagi-
nation. But it is impossible anything divisible
can be conjoined to a thought or perception,
which is a being altogether inseparable and in-
divisible. For supposing such a conjunction,
would the indivisible thought exist on the left
or on the right hand of this extended divisible
body? On the surface or in the middle? On the
back or fore side of it? If it be conjoined with
the extension, it must exist somewhere within
its dimensions. If it exist within its dimensions,
it must either exist in one particular part; and
then that particular part is indivisible, and the
perception is conjoined only with it, not with
the extension: Or if the thought exists in ev-
ery part, it must also be extended, and separa-