BOOK I PART IV
here be retorted upon them. Is the indivisible
subject, or immaterial substance, if you will, on
the left or on the right hand of the perception?
Is it in this particular part, or in that other? Is
it in every part without being extended? Or
is it entire in any one part without deserting
the rest? It is impossible to give any answer to
these questions, but what will both be absurd
in itself, and will account for the union of our
indivisible perceptions with an extended sub-
stance.
This gives me an occasion to take a-new into
consideration the question concerning the sub-
stance of the soul; and though I have con-
demned that question as utterly unintelligible,
yet I cannot forbear proposing some farther re-
flections concerning it. I assert, that the doc-
trine of the immateriality, simplicity, and indi-