BOOK I PART IV
as its substance, unless that repugnance takes
place equally betwixt the perception or impres-
sion of that extended object, and the same un-
compounded essence. Every idea of a quality
in an object passes through an impression; and
therefore every perceivable relation, whether
of connexion or repugnance, must be common
both to objects and impressions.
But though this argument, considered in
general, seems evident beyond all doubt and
contradiction, yet to make it more clear and
sensible, let us survey it in detail; and see
whether all the absurdities, which have been
found in the system of Spinoza, may not like-
wise be discovered in that of Theologians. (See
Bayle’s dictionary, article of Spinoza.)
First, It has been said against Spinoza, ac-
cording to the scholastic way of talking, rather