BOOK I PART IV
of the soul, we should give it the more antient,
and yet more modish name of an action. By
an action we mean much the same thing, as
what is commonly called an abstract mode;
that is, something, which, properly speaking, is
neither distinguishable, nor separable from its
substance, and is only conceived by a distinc-
tion of reason, or an abstraction. But nothing is
gained by this change of the term of modifica-
tion, for that of action; nor do we free ourselves
from one single difficulty by its means; as will
appear from the two following reflexions.
First, I observe, that the word, action, accord-
ing to this explication of it, can never justly be
applied to any perception, as derived from a
mind or thinking substance. Our perceptions
are all really different, and separable, and dis-
tinguishable from each other, and from every-