BOOK I PART IV
it can never produce motion; since there is no
more apparent connexion in the one case than
in the other. But as this latter conclusion is con-
trary to evident experience, and as it is possi-
ble we may have a like experience in the opera-
tions of the mind, and may perceive a constant
conjunction of thought and motion; you reason
too hastily, when from the mere consideration
of the ideas, you conclude that it is impossible
motion can ever produce thought, or a differ-
ent position of parts give rise to a different pas-
sion or reflection. Nay it is not only possible we
may have such an experience, but it is certain
we have it; since every one may perceive, that
the different dispositions of his body change
his thoughts and sentiments. And should it
be said, that this depends on the union of soul
and body; I would answer, that we must sep-
arate the question concerning the substance of