BOOK I PART IV
Being we know to have been asserted by (As
father Malebranche and other Cartesians.) sev-
eral philosophers with relation to all the actions
of the mind, except volition, or rather an incon-
siderable part of volition; though it is easy to
perceive, that this exception is a mere pretext,
to avoid the dangerous consequences of that
doctrine. If nothing be active but what has an
apparent power, thought is in no case any more
active than matter; and if this inactivity must
make us have recourse to a deity, the supreme
being is the real cause of all our actions, bad as
well as good, vicious as well as virtuous.
Thus we are necessarily reduced to the other
side of the dilemma, viz.. that all objects, which
are found to be constantly conjoined, are upon
that account only to be regarded as causes and
effects. Now as all objects, which are not con-