BOOK I PART I
ity. These ideas, therefore, admit no more of
separation than they do of distinction and dif-
ference. They are consequently conjoined with
each other in the conception; and the general
idea of a line, notwithstanding all our abstrac-
tions and refinements, has in its appearance in
the mind a precise degree of quantity and qual-
ity; however it may be made to represent oth-
ers, which have different degrees of both.
Secondly, it is contest, that no object can ap-
pear to the senses; or in other words, that no
impression can become present to the mind,
without being determined in its degrees both of
quantity and quality. The confusion, in which
impressions are sometimes involved, proceeds
only from their faintness and unsteadiness, not
from any capacity in the mind to receive any
impression, which in its real existence has no