BOOK I PART IV
mind, yet in some circumstances they are (Sect.
4.) directly contrary, nor is it possible for us
to reason justly and regularly from causes and
effects, and at the same time believe the contin-
ued existence of matter. How then shall we ad-
just those principles together? Which of them
shall we prefer? Or in case we prefer neither
of them, but successively assent to both, as is
usual among philosophers, with what confi-
dence can we afterwards usurp that glorious
title, when we thus knowingly embrace a man-
ifest contradiction?
This contradiction (Part III. Sect. 14.) would
be more excusable, were it compensated by any
degree of solidity and satisfaction in the other
parts of our reasoning. But the case is quite
contrary. When we trace up the human under-
standing to its first principles, we find it to lead