BOOK II PART I
though the effects be many, the principles, from
which they arise, are commonly but few and
simple, and that it is the sign of an unskilful
naturalist to have recourse to a different qual-
ity, in order to explain every different opera-
tion. How much more must this be true with
regard to the human mind, which being so con-
fined a subject may justly be thought incapable
of containing such a monstrous heap of princi-
ples, as would be necessary to excite the pas-
sions of pride and humility, were each distinct
cause adapted to the passion by a distinct set of
principles?
Here, therefore, moral philosophy is in the
same condition as natural, with regard to as-
tronomy before the time ofCopernicus. The
antients, though sensible of that maxim,that
nature does nothing in vain, contrived such intri-