BOOK II PART I
der the whole cause, consisting of a quality and
of a subject, does so unavoidably give rise to
the pass on.
To illustrate this hypothesis we may com-
pare it to that, by which I have already ex-
plained the belief attending the judgments,
which we form from causation. I have ob-
served, that in all judgments of this kind, there
is always a present impression and a related
idea; and that the present impression gives a
vivacity to the fancy, and the relation conveys
this vivacity, by an easy transition, to the re-
lated idea. Without the present impression,
the attention is not fixed, nor the spirits ex-
cited. Without the relation, this attention rests
on its first object, and has no farther conse-
quence. There is evidently a great analogy be-
twixt that hypothesis and our present one of an