BOOK II PART I
of it, is entirely frivolous, and that neither man
nor any other being ought ever to be thought
possest of any ability, unless it be exerted and
put in action. But though this be strictly true in
a just and philosophical way of thinking, it is
certain it is not the philosophy of our passions;
but that many things operate upon them by
means of the idea and supposition of power, in-
dependent of its actual exercise. We are pleased
when we acquire an ability of procuring plea-
sure, and are displeased when another acquires
a power of giving pain. This is evident from ex-
perience; but in order to give a just explication
of the matter, and account for this satisfaction
and uneasiness, we must weigh the following
reflections.
It is evident the error of distinguishing
power from its exercise proceeds not entirely