BOOK II PART I
strong motives, which can give us an absolute
certainty in pronouncing concerning any of his
future actions. When we see a person free from
these motives, we suppose a possibility either
of his acting or forbearing; and though in gen-
eral we may conclude him to be determined by
motives and causes, yet this removes not the
uncertainty of our judgment concerning these
causes, nor the influence of that uncertainty
on the passions. Since therefore we ascribe a
power of performing an action to every one,
who has no very powerful motive to forbear
it, and refuse it to such as have; it may justly
be concluded, that power has always a refer-
ence to its exercise, either actual or probable,
and that we consider a person as endowed with
any ability when we find from past experience,
that it is probable, or at least possible he may
exert it. And indeed, as our passions always