BOOK II PART I
cannot form any such conclusion in a way of
reasoning concerning she nearer approach of
the pleasure, it is certain he imagines it to ap-
proach nearer, whenever all external obstacles
are removed, along with the more powerful
motives of interest and danger, which oppose
it. For farther satisfaction on this head I must
refer to my account of the will, where I shall
(Part III. Sect. 2.) explain that false sensation
of liberty, which make, us imagine we can per-
form any thing, that is not very dangerous or
destructive. Whenever any other person is un-
der no strong obligations of interest to forbear
any pleasure, we judge from experience, that
the pleasure will exist, and that he will proba-
bly obtain it. But when ourselves are in that sit-
uation, we judge from an illusion of the fancy,
that the pleasure is still closer and more imme-
diate. The will seems to move easily every way,