BOOK II PART II
any passion, let us bestow on it only one of
these relations; and see what will follow. Thus
suppose, I regard a stone or any common ob-
ject, that belongs either to me or my compan-
ion, and by that means acquires a relation of
ideas to the object of the passions: It is plain,
that to consider the mattera priori, no emotion
of any kind can reasonably be expected. For be-
sides, that a relation of ideas operates secretly
and calmly on the mind, it bestows an equal
impulse towards the opposite passions of pride
and humility, love and hatred, according as the
object belongs to ourselves or others; which op-
position of the passions must destroy both, and
leave the mind perfectly free from any affection
or emotion. This reasoninga prioriis confirmed
by experience. No trivial or vulgar object, that
causes not a pain or pleasure, independent of
the passion, will ever, by its property or other