The Politics of Intervention

(sharon) #1
The Second Intervention 99

cans to take control. Roosevelt was confused as to how condi­
tions could have "changed so completely," and urged Taft
to keep trying, to work closely with the Liberals to find a
compromise: "I do not believe we should, simply because
Palma has proven obstinate, put ourselves in the place of his
unpopular government and face all the likelihood of a long
drawn-out and very destructive guerrilla warfare."^52 Still,
Taft could land troops if necessary.
In Havana, Taft worked to patch together another compro­
mise before Estrada Palma resigned. With the Liberal goals
almost achieved, Alfredo Zayas co-operated with him in order
to head off an actual occupation. The Moderate position
remained unchanged. Taft began to feel the chances for non­
intervention slipping away: "... our suggestion as a basis
of compromise seems to be thought a great victory for the
Liberals... Palma and the Moderates will now take away
their dolls and not play." Although he did not like "temporiz­
ing and compromising" with rebels because it "is a bad
precedent," "... we did not make and were not responsible
for the situation which we found."
53
Roosevelt agreed with Taft that dealing with rebels was an
evil thing, but that the Secretary had probably saved Havana
from rioting and arson. The President urged Taft not to give
up, but to avoid using the word "intervention." The whole
affair was regrettable, but not "in the slightest degree due
to any act of ours."^54 In another cable the same day (Septem­
ber 26) Roosevelt had more afterthoughts about the compro­
mises offered the rebels, and concluded that the concessions,
considering Estrada Palma's military weakness, were "the
least of two very serious evils." The President feared the
revolt had set a bad precedent, that of remedying political
disputes by force, but that however likely another revolt, the
Cubans should have one more chance at self-government.^55
Although Taft expected hostilities to begin again between
the ill-disciplined militia and the insurgents and doubted
that Estrada Palma would change his mind, he still hoped a
provisional Cuban government could be formed. Estrada

Free download pdf