178 THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION
Juan Gualberto Gomez, and Martin Morua Delgado. The
Liberals' concern is understandable because the Negro move
ment endangered the Liberal patronage system. The Negroes'
case against the Liberals was made clear in the Lajas Declara
tion, signed by twenty-three Negro leaders in Santa Clara:
If the title of revolutionist will get one public positions, we Negroes
are revolutionists, too; and if it is necessary to be capable, we Negroes
have ability also; and just as a white man goes to fill a position with
out any experience and acquires his knowledge while in that office, the
colored people can do the same.^38
The Provisional Government's concern with the Negro
movement was as great as that of the politicos, but it was
not certain what the Negroes' goals were or how they would
try to achieve them. The movement, however, could not be
ignored, and it formed an essential part of the pattern of
tension that held Cuba in the tiempo muerto of 1907. Strikes,
unemployment, drought, yellow fever, high prices, rumors of
revolt, the political factions in flux—all threatened to shatter
the surface tranquillity. The central question that bound the
interests of the government, the politicos, and the annexation
ists was: Would there now be a real, general insurrection?
The Masso Parra Conspiracy
On June 22, 1907, the man who would attempt to turn
Cuban anxiety into a bloody revolt against the Americans
walked into the Cuban consulate in Port-au-Prince, Haiti,
asked for the news from Havana, and then announced he
was returning "home."^39 His name was Juan Masso Parra
and his business was insurrection. Son of a Spanish merchant
in Manzanillo, Masso Parra fought on the insurgent side of
the revolt against Spain until January 19, 1898. On that day
he and his entire battalion of 107 men defected to the Span
ish, and resumed fighting, against the insurgents, as merciless
guerrillas. Masso Parra later explained his treachery as dis
gust with the Cuban generals, but he was also paid hand