The Reconstruction of the Cuban Armed Forces 233investment on political, economic, and military grounds. Let
the funds instead be used for road-building, which would
bring general economic improvement, essential for internal
peace. Improve Cuba's transportation system and farm pro
duce would come in from the countryside, thus underwriting
a rejuvenated freeholding class. As for internal security, an
enlarged Rural Guard would suffice.^36
A sincere objection to the Permanent Army reached
Washington from an American planter in Cuba, Mr. H. E.
Havens. Havens' analysis went more deeply into political
problems such as economic backwardness and the social
acceptability of violence in Cuba than did most American
criticism. In thinking over the proposed plan for a regular
Cuban army, Havens believed
... that such a measure could do no good and would have in it the
greatest peril to the people of this Island. The politicians are divided
into hostile factions of the most bitter and vicious character, all stimu
lated by a consuming desire for the opportunity to make appropriations
and operate the various forms of graft peculiar to the Cuban Govern
ment, and animated by no trace of genuine patriotism. Some one of
these factions would succeed to the control of the proposed Army upon
the withdrawal of the United States troops; and that control would
inevitably be used to protect against their rascalities; and also to control
elections and maintain themselves in power.
It now seems probable that those politicians who call themselves the
Liberal Party will carry the elections and obtain control. Those men are
not of as high character as those who surrounded Palma and are more
desperate, reckless and ravenous, and under any conditions would prove
dangerous to the peace and safety of the people of Cuba. But to place
Fifteen Thousand armed men under their authority, and then withdraw
the United States troops would create an alarming condition.
But if the so-called Liberals fail to obtain control some other faction
will, and there is not enough difference between them to make any
material differences as to consequences.
The maintenance of an appearance of peace by suppressing the peo
ple with an armed force in the hands of a gang of professional looters
and grafters is not the sort of peace the United States should wish to be
responsible for. If the United States is to withdraw from Cuba it would
be far better to leave the people the remedy of revolution against the
inevitable abuses of the factions in the ascendency, than to place them
at the mercy of a corrupt despotism, and call it established peace.