The Politics of Intervention

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The August Revolution 67

insurgents' sources of information. If American soldiers were
to be committed against the Constitutional Army, Funston
suggested that the bulk of the troops be cavalry and mounted
infantry organized in self-sustaining columns of five hundred
to a thousand men. Because the Cubans' greatest weakness
was their difficulty in feeding columns of more than four
thousand, the Army could count on having to pursue the
guerrilla bands as they foraged. Funston thought that the
Americans could break up the Cuban columns initially against
adverse odds of five-to-one, but that a guerrilla war would
call for a larger troop commitment.
Roosevelt, after studying Bell's letter and the General Staff's
preliminary study, wrote the Chief of Staff that he agreed
with his analysis and approved the dispatch of two Army
officers to report on military conditions in Cuba, for Bell was
not satisfied that the newspapers, his only source of informa­
tion, were reliable.^26 The officers, Major Eugene F. Ladd and
Captain Dwight E. Aultman, were both veterans of Wood's
Military Government and experts in Cuban affairs. Ladd had
been the island's auditor and treasurer, and Aultman, until
1904, adviser to Cuba's Corps of Artillery.
Upon learning of Bell's letter and Roosevelt's decision to
send military observers to Cuba, Taft wrote the President
and clearly stated the central consideration in the United
States subsequent reaction to the deepening crisis in Cuba:
"What Bell says is entirely true, that if we sent our men there
to suppress disorder we would have a fight on our hands
very much like we had in the Philippines.... "^27
At this point, Roosevelt was not yet ready to commit the
United States to open support of Estrada Palma, but clearly
he was willing to supply the Cuban government with muni­
tions and to investigate the possibility of action against the
rebels. His military advisers had been frank and realistic, but
they had not urged armed intervention. The President, who
did not even mention the Cuban crisis in a September 4
letter to Elihu Root, was waiting for a clearer picture of
the insurrection.^28

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