ȁȇȃ Partʺʺ: Politics and Philosophyof terminology, supposing that each one labels a definite aspect of reality,
brooding over these aspects or concepts to grasp the “essence” of each, and
perhaps brooding further over whether the realities corresponding to two
or more concepts could exist together.ȀTrying to gain knowledge in this
way proceeds backward. Perceiving uniformities and diversities in the real
world belongs ahead of brooding over words to label them. Conceivably,
traditional formulations of the whole supposed issue of free will versus
determinism will prove misconceived.
şŏŔŘŕŏŗ śŚ ŠŔő ŕşşšő
My admiration for two ethicists in particular, Moritz Schlick and Henry
Hazlitt, predisposed me toward their solutions; yet in the end I find them
incomplete or otherwise unsatisfying. Schlick regarded the supposed issue
as a mere pseudo-problem: determinism and free will reconcile (ȀȈȂǿ/ȀȈȅȀ,
chap.Ţŕŕ). Causality can operate while leaving individuals some freedom
not only over what acts they perform but also over what choices they make.
Ļe opposite of freedom is compulsion, and determination does not mean
compulsion. In the words of R.E. Hobart, whose views are discussed
below, compulsion implies causation but causation does not necessarily
imply compulsion.ȁ
Schlick identifies a confusion between descriptive and prescriptive
laws. Scientific lawsdescribehow the world works; they do notprescribe
events; they do not resemble totally enforced legislationmakingevents
unfold as they do. Kepler’s Laws describe how the planets revolve around
the sun; they are not prescriptions compelling them to revolve as they do.
Ļe law of demand describes how buyers respond to alternative levels of
an item’s price (apart from other overriding influences); it does not compel
buyers to behave in the way it describes.
ȀWalter Eucken (ȀȈȄǿ, pp.Ȅǿ–ȄȀ,ȂȁȈ–ȂȂǿ) effectively blasts such essentialism or con-
ceptual realism in economics.
ȁJust what is compulsion? How may we distinguish acts done under compulsion from
free acts for which a person is responsible? In a sense, as Gerald Dworkin (ȀȈȆǿ/ȀȈȇȃ)
notes, a person does his every act because he prefers it to any alternative open to him
under the circumstances—even submitting to a highwayman. Dworkin distinguishes,
then, between two sorts of desires or reasons for action. A free act is one motivated by a
reason that the agent finds acceptable. A person acts under compulsion when responding
to a reason that he does not want to have.
Although Dworkin may be on the right track, his distinction is inexact. One may
undergo an operation, free from compulsion, while wishing that the reason for the oper-
ation did not exist.