ȁȈȇ Partʺʺ: Politics and Philosophythe world actually works is a sham. No perceptions of persons that they
are more than mere cogs in tightly working machinery, that they have
some scope for making decisions nottotallypredetermined by their genetic
makeups and past experiences, count for anything; for these very per-
ceptions have themselves been predetermined. Similarly, no number of
episodes in which unexpected, astonishing, or unpredictable decisions of
particular persons brought major consequences count for anything. Appar-
ent examples of formidable exertions of will count for nothing. Ļe the-
ory itself rules such episodes out as evidence on the grounds that the cited
decisions and exertions, as well as their being unexpected, astonishing, or
apparently unpredictable, are themselves mere links in the universal causal
chain. Examples in which a person seems to have changed his very char-
acter by effort of will would not faze the determinist. He would maintain
that the person’s exertion of will, and with what degree of success, were
themselves predetermined. Determinism does not deny that praise and
blame, reward and punishment, can be efficacious in influencing behav-
ior; it simply maintains that these in turn are predetermined.
What adverse evidence of any sort is even conceivable, then, from
which the theory does not protect itself in advance? A theory that can
accommodate absolutely any evidence does not specify any genuine restric-
tions on how the real world actually works; its ostensible empirical char-
acter is a sham.
Furthermore, the theory does not carry any actual implications for
how to live one’s own life or for public policy. Should individuals culti-
vate a sense of control over their own decisions and actions or, at the other
extreme, cultivate a fatalistic outlook? Some psychologists may offer the
one line of advice and others the opposite line; but in any case, each is
merely offering the advice he is fated to offer. A determinist philosopher
is not necessarily bound to advise the fatalistic outlook; for he may recog-
nize the benefits of feelings of autonomy and responsibility and himself
feel, furthermore, that he is fatednotto undercut such feelings and the
benefits flowing from them. Each ordinary individual, similarly, is receiv-
ing the advice he is fated to receive and will respond to it, along with other
influences, as he is fated to respond.
Should criminals be held more responsible for their actions and more
liable to punishment than they currently are or, on other hand, should the
Clarence Darrow defense be given greater heed? Ļe first policy shift may
reduce crime and make for a healthier society on that account, although
it would be unfair to criminals who are, on the determinist theory, mere