Chapter dzǹ: Is Ļere a Bias Toward Overregulation? ȂȁȄof thousands of people, directly and indirectly. How many restaurants
near the Music Center in downtown Los Angeles would remain open
without the audiences that the Center draws? Ļe arts offer pleasure and
entertainment and stimulation. State and local governments have made
too much of a commitment to them to back out now without seriously
retarding their progress. “A society that considers it a frill to nourish its
soul is in deep trouble.” In reply, a reader asked: “What kind of trou-
ble can be expected by a society that depends on government to nour-
ish its soul?” (BeaverȀȈȆȇ, p.Ȁȁ). Ļe journalist tacitly accepts the notion
that not to finance particular activities by taxes—by compulsion—is to
be neglectful of them. Also noteworthy is his misuse, regarding down-
town Los Angeles, of the overworked theoretical argument about exter-
nalities—here, spillover benefits.
Much the same points that apply to spending apply also to regulation.
Some economic interest groups benefit from regulation (perhaps it pro-
tects them against competition) and automatically have the information
and incentives to press candidates and legislators for what they want. Ļe
latter, for their part, are rationally more responsive to special-interest pres-
sures than to the general interest of the average voters, who are rationally
ignorant and apathetic about the details of public policy. Furthermore,
citizens who identify themselves with some cause—protecting the envi-
ronment, cracking down on health and safety hazards, developing exotic
energy sources, fostering the arts, remedying supposedly unjust inequal-
ities, suppressing (or facilitating) abortion, improving the eating habits
of school children, or whatever—take on the political characters of spe-
cial interests and, like them, tend to have disproportionate influence with
politicians or the relevant bureaucrats. Ļe much discussed “new class”
of activist intellectuals and publicists belongs in the story. Legislators,
bureaucrats, and other members of the government themselves have per-
sonal stakes in government activism, though many of them are no doubt
sincerely motivated to do good as they conceive of doing good in their
own special niches in life.
řőŠŔśŐśŘśœŕŏōŘ ŕŚŐŕŢŕŐšōŘŕşř ঠōŚōŘťŦŕŚœ
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None of this amounts to casting aspersions on the moral characters of
the people who take part in deciding on government activities. I am sim-
ply drawing implications from the fact that these people decide and act