ȂȂǿ Partʺʺ: Politics and Philosophyclamoring interest by helping it get what it wants and to compensate the
others by doing the same for them. Under these circumstances, logrolling
(explicit in legislatures and implicit in political platforms) assembles major-
ities out of essentially unrelated minorities. “Minorities rule”Ȁȃ(DahlȀȈȅȂ,
pp.ȀȁȄ–ȀȂǿ)—nottheminority, but an implicit coalition of several minori-
ties. Suppose that for each of three programs,ȁȄpercent of the voters
favor it so intensely that they would vote for whichever candidate sup-
ports it, regardless of his position on other issues. Seventy-five percent of
the voters oppose each program, but only mildly. Suppose, further, that
the minority favoring each of the three programs is a distinct group. (To
recognize that two or three of the groups have some members in common
would complicate the example without affecting its point.) A candidate
supporting all three programs would be elected overwhelmingly and be
put in a position to work for their enactment, even thoughȆȄpercent of
the electorate opposed each program. Ļe same sort of implicit logrolling
operates, though less clearly than in this example, in the growth of gov-
ernment budgets. As the example suggests, by the way, the political pro-
cess affords scope for political entrepreneurship and not just for passive
response to existing demands.
Particularly as the vote-trading process spreads out over time and over
numerous separate ballots, spurious consensus becomes possible. Policy
combinations get adopted that could not have commanded a majority if
considered as a whole. Ļe procedure of making decisions year by year
leads to commitments to the future growth of spending that are not seen
or not appreciated when made, yet are hard to reverse later. Furthermore,
the automatic growth of revenue as the economy grows and as inflation
proceeds, pushing taxpayers into higher brackets, allows the government
to avoid anexplicitdecision to raise taxes to cover increased spending
(SteinȀȈȆȇ, p.ȁǿ).
Ļe politics of abortion illustrates the influence of intensely concerned
minorities. Ļe California and Massachusetts legislatures were so em-
broiled in controversy over public funding of abortions in JulyȀȈȆȇthat
they failed to finish their budget work in time for the new fiscal year. A
single issue fought over intensely by small but well-organized groups can
distract politicians’ attention from matters of broad but unfocused pub-
lic concern. Similarly, a vast majority may grumble about high taxes, but
its concern is so diffuse (or has been, until recently) that it can seldom
Ȁȃ“Minorities Rule” is the title of the reprinted version of DahlȀȈȅȂ, pp.Ȁȁȃ–ȀȂȃ, in
FeinȀȈȅȃ, pp.ȀȁȄ–ȀȂǿ.