Chapter dzǹ: Is Ļere a Bias Toward Overregulation? ȂȂȄlaws and abolishing agencies, activism generally offers more scope for
brightness, as well as for maintaining political alliances, especially in an
intellectual atmosphere predisposed to activism.
ŠŔő ŎšŞőōšŏŞōŠ
Ļe bureaucrat, like the politician, may well see his mission in life as doing
good through the agency of government. He is likely, though, except at
the highest levels, to be a specialist. (At the highest levels, he is likely
to be mobile between government positions and to be judged more by
his reputed abilities and performance in the short run than by the long-
run consequences of how he runs any particular agency.) Ļe specialist
identifies with the mission of his bureau, appreciates the value of its ser-
vices, but appreciates less clearly the alternative results obtainable from
devoting the necessary money and resources to other purposes, public or
private. Like most people, he wants to think that his job is important and
demanding and that he is doing it well. With a bigger budget and a larger
staff, he could serve the public still better. Fortunately for his ambitions,
the legislators must depend largely on what he and his fellow experts tell
them about the benefits and costs of his agency’s activities. Because his
job is specialized and complicated and because they have other tasks also,
the legislators cannot monitor him closely. Furthermore, alliances tend to
form among the agency, the members of the legislative committee moni-
toring it, and the constituency in the private sector that benefits from the
agency’s services or regulations.ȀȈ
ŠŔő ŏśšŞŠş
Judges, like other government decisionmakers, are often in a position to
take a narrow view, doing what seems good or benevolent in the par-
ticular case at hand without having to weigh costs against benefits care-
fully and without having to exercise adequate foresight about the long-run
ȀȈWilliam A. Niskanen (ȀȈȆȀ) argues that bureaucrats strive to maximize their bud-
gets. Years earlier, Ludwig von Mises had stressed the contrast between a profit-seeking
firm and a bureau. In a firm, the higher executives can monitor the performance of their
subordinates by financial accounting and the test of profit and loss. Monitoring is more
complicated in a nonprofit organization. Especially in one that gets its funds from budget
appropriations rather than by selling goods or services to willing customers, the financial
tests are necessarily weakened, and detailed “bureaucratic” rules and regulations must take
their place as best they can (MisesȀȈȃȄ).