Chapter dzǹ: Is Ļere a Bias Toward Overregulation? ȂȃȂwith each other and to use and deal in their own property.ȂǿIt is a ques-
tionable view to accord equal respect to people’s use of their own property
and forcible interference with that use. Ļat view sets aside the question
of who has a right to do what in favor of the question of which expected
pattern of property use and resource allocation appeals more to politicians
and other outside observers.
ŜśŘŕŏť ŕřŜŘŕŏōŠŕśŚş
What implications follow from my argument, if it is broadly correct? Most
generally, it recommends alertness to activist bias, and an appropriate con-
stitutional attitude. Proposals have been made for a regulatory budget:
included in the annual limit to each regulatory agency’s expenses would
be not only its own cash outlays but also the estimated costs that compli-
ance with its regulations would impose on the private sector. Admittedly,
implementing such a proposal would run into practical difficulties, but it
is mainly its spirit that concerns us here.
It is instructive to review the rationale for the analogous proposal of
placing a constitutional limit on federal government taxing or spending.
Ļe opportunity to enact such a limit would give the public at large the
hitherto lacking means to vote on the total of the government budget. By
voting for a limit, a majority could override the spending bias that arises
from the accumulation of smaller special-interest decisions.ȂȀĻe people
assign a budget to the legislature and require it spend the limited amount
of money in the most effective way. (Supporters of a limit ask: if families
have to operate within income ceilings, why shouldn’t the government
also?) Overall limitation would force choices among the many spending
programs that might be separately desirable. To argue persuasively in the
face of a given budget total, a group wanting a particular program would
have to point out other budget items that could and should be cut. Special
interests would then be forced to work for the general interest rather than
against it.
Regulatory activity is not as quantifiable as taxing and spending. But it
would be premature to give up on ingenuity. Perhaps a quantitative specifi-
cation will prove impossible and procedural restraints will have to serve as
a substitute. A constitutional amendment might require that enactment of
ȂǿSee Tibor R. MachanȀȈȆȈ.
ȂȀSeeWall Street JournalȀȈȆȇand, in particular, Milton FriedmanȀȈȆȇ, pp.Ȇ–Ȁȃ.