Chapter dzǺ: Economics and Principles ȂȄȀ(Vagueness and flexibility are undesirable, however, as characteristics of
government law.)
For insight into the respective merits of voluntarism and law in var-
ious aspects of life, let us consider the familiar kind of appeal for volun-
tary restraint in pricing, in wage demands, in energy consumption, and
in spending and investing abroad. Such an approach tends, I argue, to
undermine ordinary morality. By and large, it is in a person’s long-run
self-interest to behave with ordinary decency and to cultivate the kind of
character that leads him to do so.ȃFor this proposition to hold true, social
institutions should be such as to hold down tension between self-interest
and social interest (ostensible or actual), allowing the invisible hand to
work. While legal rules and penalties do have a role in such arrangements,
it is tremendously important for social cooperation that people generally
be able to trust each other anyway. Voluntary decency is a scarce resource
not to be wasted.
“Wasting” voluntary decency means putting an excessive strain on
the implicit contract existing among members of society to treat each
other decently. Such a strain occurs when, as is likely to be true in the
context of appeals to “voluntary” economic self-denial, behavior in the
supposed social interest does in fact clash with self-interest. A counter-
argument to my contention is often more implicit than explicit. It sees
value in giving people exercise for their moral muscles—habit-forming
exercise in setting aside self-interest in the social interest. I conjecture,
though, that plenty of occasions for moral exercise arise anyway in every-
day life, when an excessively narrow and short-run conception of self-
interest clashes with a fuller conception. I am warning against the kind
of exercise that strains and damages moral muscles because the clash
between self-interest and supposed social interest is genuine and not
merely apparent.
understanding, with a minority of individuals leading the way. In morality as in law, con-
tinuity and modifiability both have value. Change is desirable in view of changing cir-
cumstances and knowledge, but not change so rapid that people cannot act and form
expectations on the basis of a known moral code.
ȃOr so argue writers whom I respect, such as Moritz Schlick (ȀȈȂǿ/ȀȈȅȁ), Mortimer
Adler (ȀȈȆǿ), and Ayn Rand (ȀȈȄȆand other novels). In effect they argue that the best
prospects for a satisfying life hinge on having the sort of character that sometimes leads
one to subordinate one’s immediate narrow interest or whim to one’s more enduring inter-
est. Yet exceptions do occur; and in rare cases, decency will cost a man his life. Still, while
a decent character does not guarantee happiness—nothing can—it tends to improve the
probabilities. See SchlickȀȈȂǿ/ȀȈȅȁ, pp.ȀȇȄ–ȀȈȈ, but esp. pp.ȀȈȂ–ȀȈȃ.