Ȃȅȇ Partʺʺ: Politics and Philosophy
scarcely bothering to describe what his standard of comparison might be.
He does invoke, but only ritualistically, the criteria of Pareto optimality
and wealth maximization (pp.Ȃ–ȅ,ȁȁn., chap.ȀȀ). Relative to what is
democracy “efficient”? Relative to other forms of government? Relative to
leaving wide aspects of life outside the political arena, as the American
Founders evidently intended? Wittman does not say.
Wittman argues his efficiency claim feebly. He scarcely goes beyond
asserting that the positions he attacks are incorrect or have been “exagger-
ated.” (“I have already argued that the degree of opportunism by politi-
cians has been greatly exaggerated,” p.ȂȂ.) Such claims are hard to con-
front and are correspondingly limp, since some exaggerations occur on
almost any side of any issue. Furthermore, Wittman relies heavily on the
analogy—hardly more than that—between economic markets and demo-
cratic politics (“this book develops an invisible-hand theory of efficient
democratic markets,” p.Ȃ). Gordon Tullock, Richard Posner, and others
had argued that spending to curry government favors will tend to dissipate
the rents sought. Wittman replies that rules will develop to minimize the
social cost. Campaign contributions are not dead losses; they help provide
valuable information. Besides, rent-seeking goes on in the business sec-
tor also. Pet stores push sales of bird feeders, which redistributes income
from humans to birds. If rent-seeking is not viewed as a serious problem
in the business sector, it probably should not be so viewed in political
markets either (p.Ȃȅ).
Wittman provides many more examples of trying merely to talk away
points made by public-choice analysts. Political entrepreneurs, like busi-
ness entrepreneurs, can gain from discovering and exploiting unknown
demands, providing related information, and clearing up confusion. So
doing, they help solve the supposed problems of the “rational ignorance”
of voters and the differential information of special interests. As for princi-
pal-agent problems (problems of monitoring by voters of their supposed
political servants), well, they are mitigated by institutions such as gov-
ernment structure, political parties, and candidate reputation. Besides, if
the principal cannot monitor his political agent, then neither can the aca-
demic researcher. Competition for office reduces politicians’ potential for
opportunism and shirking. Ļe party is the analogue in politics of the
franchise in the business sector. Party labels, accumulated reputations,
interest-group endorsements, and comparative political advertising also
provide good substitutes for specific knowledge about particular candi-
dates. Voters discount information from sources known to be biased. As