Chapter ǴǶ: Kirzner on the Morality of Capitalist Profit ȃǿȈproduce it, as given. Ļey deal with the supposed issue of justice in appro-
priating what already exists. Once, though, we recognize the creativeness
of entrepreneurial discovery, “we can no longer be satisfied with a moral
philosophy which, in its consideration of property rights and property
institutions, treats the world as if the future is an unending series of fully
perceived manna-deposits waiting to be assigned and distributed” (ȀȈȇȈ,
p.ȀȄǿ; cf. p.ȀȅȀ). As for pure profit, John Bates Clark’s purported marginal-
productivity defense of capitalist distribution does not even claim to deal
with it.
Nozick’s theory is unsatisfactory in a further way. It relies on John
Locke’s justification of private appropriation of previously unowned re-
sources from nature. Ļe appropriator acquires just title by mixing his
own labor with them, labor assumed to be unquestionably his property.
Locke hedges this justification with the proviso that the appropriator
leave “enough and as good” resources available for latecomers. Ļis pro-
viso can scarcely ever be met, however, since appropriating resources from
an unowned common stock brings closer a stage at which a subsequent
appropriator simply could not leave “enough and as good” available for
still later would-be appropriators (ȀȈȇȈ, pp.ȀȄȅ–ȀȄȆ). It is no answer to
postulate that the resources are so superabundant in relation not only to
present human wants but even to all future wants that they would never
become economically scarce. Few if any resources meet such a specifica-
tion, leaving Locke’s theory relevant only to an imaginary world. If any
resources were inexhaustibly abundant and destined to remain free goods
forever, they would hardly be resources in an economic sense; and making
them private property would be pointless in the first place. It is only in a
world of scarcity that private property matters.
Since Kirzner’s doctrine does not pertain to appropriation of already
existing things, it is unencumbered by any Lockean proviso (ȀȈȈȁb, p.ȁȁȄ).
In seeing that some hitherto unrecognized and valueless aspect of nature
might be put to economic use, the alert entrepreneur in effectcreatesthe
result. He cannot deprive anyone of what did not previously exist. No
question arises of leaving “enough and as good” for others.
David Schmidtz (ȀȈȈȀ, chap.ȁ) confronts the Lockean proviso in a
way different from but reconcilable with Kirzner’s. Schmidtz reformu-
lates it as justifying an appropriation of resources from nature if it does
not worsen and especially if it improves theopportunitiesopen to other
persons. Instituting private property does in general do so, while leaving
things owned by no one or owned in common practically ensures their