ȃȀȃ Partʺʺ: Politics and Philosophy
mentions Robert Nozick’s (ȀȈȆȃ, pp.ȀȅȀ–ȀȅȂ) hypothetical example of Wilt
Chamberlain, who arranges for spectators to pay an additionalȁȄcents
earmarked for him beyond the regular price of admission to his basket-
ball games. Nozick holds Chamberlain fully entitled to this income. Still,
one might disagree. By paying voluntarily, the spectators are not neces-
sarily approving the financial arrangements and the additional inequal-
ity of income distribution that results; they are not necessarily indicating
opposition to a supposed remedy through redistributionary taxation. Ļe
individual spectator might realize that he alone could not thwart the anti-
egalitarian result by boycotting the game, so he might as well attend if he
values the performance sufficiently more than the ticket price plus Cham-
berlain’sȁȄcents. Partly because, in economists’ jargon, an externality is
operating, the voluntariness of the transactions does not automatically
confer moral legitimacy on Chamberlain’s wealth. James Buchanan (ȀȈȆȆ,
chap.ȃ) argues, in part, that Chamberlain’s large income is an economic
rent, itself largely attributable to the society in which he has the good
fortune of performing, and that other, equally voluntary, arrangements
could distribute this rent much differently. Although I myself dislike the
attitude of my hypothetical spectator, neither that critic nor Buchanan
commits a logical fallacy.
InĻe Mirage of Social Justice(ȀȈȆȅ) and other works, F.A. Hayek dis-
missed “social justice” as an empty pair of words. Although one might
speak of the justice or injustice of a deliberate parceling out of an existing
stock of goods, such an evaluation cannot pertain to the pattern of dis-
tribution of income and wealth that results, unplanned by anyone, from
the market process of innumerable decentralized decisions. (Ļe result of
the market process is not even a “distribution” in the strict, etymologi-
cal sense.) One might as well discuss the justice or injustice of natural
phenomena.
Although I have not looked up adverse reviews of Hayek’s work, I
can well imagine a critic replying that it is unjust to leave a particular dis-
tribution of income and wealth uncorrected, however spontaneous it is
and however little it is anyone’s fault, if it can be corrected without unac-
ceptable side effects. Bad luck, or unfair shakes from nature, can in some
circumstances and to some extent be remedied by being shared. Leaving
remediable bad luck nevertheless unremedied might reasonably—I do not
say conclusively—be deemed unfair.
Defenders of capitalism will have to do better than simply dismiss
discussions of social justice and injustice as having no subject matter but