ȃȁȅ Partʺʺ: Politics and Philosophystate of satisfaction attained by various individuals” and make “compari-
son[s] between various people’s happiness”(MisesȀȈȃȈ/ȀȈȅȂ, p.ȁȃȁ).ŏŞŕŠŕŏŕşř
Mises’s utilitarianism has drawn criticism even from students and oth-
ers inspired by his work. I do not maintain that Mises expounded the
subtlest versions of utilitarianism, complete with distinctions between
act utilitarianism and the various “rule” or “indirect” versions. He was
writing before most philosophical treatments of these subtleties were
published. Furthermore, the subtleties were not essential to his main
concerns, theoretical and applied economics. Still, his basic philosophi-
cal stance is worth defending (HazlittȀȈȅȃoffers an admirably detailed
defense).
One of his critics, Karen Vaughn regretted that
Mises, unfortunately, attempted to refute the collectivists and authoritar-
ians by accepting the terms of their argument and arguing for the supe-
rior ability of the free market to provide for the economic well-being
of the populace.... Such an attempt to defend freedom is dangerous
on two counts. First, it is open to empirical refutation. (VaughnȀȈȆȅ,
p.ȀǿȈ)Second, such a defense is dangerous because of “nonmaterial items
in individual utility functions” (ȀȈȆȅ, p.ȀǿȈ). Bureaucrats may enjoy con-
trolling and regulating. If their utilities should be taken into account and
if interpersonal comparisons are not possible, how can we be sure that a
nonliberal system will not provide “maximum social welfare”?
Vaughn seems to approve of the reported intellectual outlook in seven-
teenth-century England, when liberalism was emerging. Ļen, she says,
“freedom was considered ... desirable for its own sake [as] a natural con-
dition of human beings.... It was a moral value that, as a bonus, also hap-
pened to lead to the well-being of society.” Ļe utilitarian argument sim-
ply provided “additional fire power.” “By the time of John Stuart Mill,
however, the argument became reversed, and freedom was espoused, not
because it was a good in itself, but because it led to the ‘greatest good for
the greatest number’” (p.Ȁǿȇ).
Possibly I have misunderstood her, but Vaughn does seem to say that
Mises was wrong to develop arguments for freedom because they might
conceivably be refuted and the case for freedom thereby embarrassed. To