Chapter ǴǷ: Mises and His Critics on Ethics, Rights, and Law ȃȁȈI myself, for example, deplore psychological and sociological and other
positive inquiry into what sorts of preferences and attitudes and lifestyles
tend in fact to serve or to undercut social cooperation and happiness. But
saying so in no way commits me to wanting the state to implement the
supposed findings of such inquiries.
Ļe utilitarian, says Rothbard, “hasno conceptionlet alone theory of
justice.”ȂWith regard to property rights in particular, the utilitarian “must
fall back on the pragmatic,ad hocview that all titles to private property cur-
rently existing at any time or place must be treated as valid and accepted as
worthy of defense against violation” (RothbardȀȈȇȁ, p.Ȅȁ). “[U]tilitarians
... plac[e] an arbitrary and indiscriminate ethical blessing upon every cur-
rent property title” (ȀȈȇȁ, pp.Ȅȇ–ȄȈ). If the tyrannical king of Ruritania
dissolves his rule but first divides up the whole country into the private
property of himself and his relatives, “consistent utilitarians ... must bow
to this subterfuge” (ȀȈȇȁ, p.Ȅȃ).
But where does Rothbard get this notion that utilitarianism requires
respect for even patently spurious titles?ȃMises’s discussion inSocialism
(ȀȈȁȁ/ȀȈȄȀ) is quite sophisticated and hardly bears out the suspicion that
he would defend even the ethically shabbiest status quo.
To make the case for laissez faire and the free-market economy, says
Rothbard,
one must go beyond economics and utilitarianism to establish an objec-
tive ethics that affirms the overriding value of liberty and morally con-
demns all forms of statism, from egalitarianism to the murder of red-
heads, as well as such goals as the lust for power and the satisfaction of
envy. To make the full case for liberty, one cannot be a methodologi-
cal slave to every goal that the majority of the public might happen to
cherish. (RothbardȀȈȆȅ, p.ȀǿȈ)But why would anyone want to make a case for liberty, the free mar-
ket, and laissez faire and against statism, envy, and the lust for power
except out of concern for the character of society and, more fundamen-
tally, for the happiness of its members? Andhow couldanyone go about
making such a case except in some broadly utilitarian way? It seems
backwards to desire a foundation for a particular policy stance before
ȂRothbardȀȈȇȁ, p.Ȅȁ,—but what about John Stuart Mill’sUtilitarianism,ȀȇȅȂ/ȀȈȅȇ,
chap.Ȅ?
ȃRothbardȀȈȇȁ, p.ȅǿn.ȁ, does cite Mises’sSocialismȀȈȁȁ/ȀȈȂȁ/ȀȈȄȀ, pp.ȃȄ–ȃȆ.