ŏ Ŕ ō Ŝ Š ő Ş șȝĻe Moral Element in Mises’s
Human Action*
şŏŕőŚŏő ōŚŐ ŢōŘšőş
Israel Kirzner recently asked how Ludwig von Mises could claim to be
pursuing value-free science while at the same time showing “enormous
passion” to communicate its truths (KirznerȀȈȈȇ, pp.Ȅȇȁ–Ȅȇȅ). “Passion”
in that context implies moral judgment, a concern for truth over falsehood
and right over wrong. I will embroider a bit on how Kirzner answered his
own question, which, by the way, recognizes the fact/value or is/ought dis-
tinction. Further, I will review Mises’s insights into the basis of morality.
As Kirzner argued, the passionate pursuit of value-free truths involves
no contradiction. Mises wanted people to have the opportunity to pur-
sue happiness successfully. Ļat opportunity presupposes what he called
“social cooperation,” meaning a secure and peaceful society in which peo-
ple can interact to their mutual benefit while pursuing their own diverse
specializations, projects, and kinds of excellence. Such a society presup-
poses policies that serve, rather than undercut, social cooperation; and
they in turn presuppose that policymakers and the public have some under-
standing of economics—value-free science. It is too much to expect that
most people should actively understand economics; perhaps it suffices
if they have the humility to recognize their ignorance and refrain from
destructively imposing its consequences.
Still, it is important that enough people do get economics straight and
disseminate its teachings. Ļat requires subtle insights and a perspective
different from those of the layperson. Its conclusions are counterintuitive,
and fallacies pervade public opinion. Most do not understand the law of
*Ļis lecture was presented as one in a series at Hillsdale College and published in
Human Action: AǷDz-Year Tribute, ed. Richard M. Ebeling (Hillsdale, Mich.: Hillsdale
College Press,ȁǿǿǿ).ȃȃȂ