Chapter ǴǸ: Ļe Moral Element in Mises’sHuman Action ȃȃȈof stockjobber ethics ... “peddler mentality,” “dollar philosophy.” [Eco-
nomics is scorned.] (ȀȈȈǿ, pp.ȁǿȈ–ȁȀǿ)
Writing probably inȀȈȃȈorȀȈȄǿ, Mises recognizes that science does
not have the duty to tell people what to seek as their chief good. In assess-
ing a doctrine, we have to ask only whether it is logically coherent or self-
contradictory and whether its practical application will help people attain
their desired ends. We have to consider doctrines as recipes for action
and apply no other standard than that of whether they will work (ȀȈȈǿ,
pp.Ȃǿǿ–ȂǿȀ).
Utilitarianism has rejected all standards of a heteronomous moral law,
which has to be accepted and obeyed regardless of the consequences aris-
ing therefrom. For [sic] the utilitarian point of view a deed is a crime
because its results are detrimental to society and not because some peo-
ple believe that they hear in their soul a mystical voice which calls it a
crime. We do not talk about problems of ethics. (ȀȈȈǿ, p.ȂǿȀ)In various writings Mises disavows hedonism in the narrow sense. Not-
withstanding superficial critics, “happiness” does not mean mere mate-
rial, bodily pleasures. Advanced utilitarians, he says, interpret pleasure and
pain, utility and disutility in “purely formal” senses, referring to whatever
individuals in fact try to achieve or avoid (ȀȈȂȂ/ȀȈȅǿ, pp.Ȅȁ,ȀȄȀ;ȀȈȆȈ/ȀȈȇȄ,
pp.Ȁȁ–ȀȂ; andȀȈȃȈ/ȀȈȅȅ, p.ȁȀ).
Mises recognizes that many people, especially creative workers, are not
driven by material desires or narrow self-interest alone. Ļey may also be
expressing competence and strength and even heroism (ȀȈȀȈ/ȀȈȇȂ, pp.ȀȈȂ,
ȁȀȂ). Besides people concerned only with their own egos, there are “people
with whom awareness of the troubles of their fellow men causes as much
uneasiness as or even more uneasiness than their own wants” (ȀȈȃȈ/ȀȈȅȅ,
p.Ȁȃ).
Mises occasionally slipped into repeating slogans about “the great-
est happiness for the greatest number” (ȀȈȀȈ/ȀȈȇȂ, p.ȀȇȂ). Such a for-
mulation has no precise meaning, of course. All that Mises presumably
meant by it is that the happiness to be furthered by morality and other
social institutions and practices is the happiness of people in general—of
the random member of society—rather than the differential happiness of
specific persons or classes at the expense of others. Mises specifically repu-
diated any idea—such as critics enjoy attacking—of trying to maximize
any numerical aggregate of measurable individual utilities (ȀȈȃȈ/ȀȈȅȅ,
p.ȁȃȁ).