Chapter ǴǸ: Ļe Moral Element in Mises’sHuman Action ȃȄȂnot reject socialism on principle. But it does reject in advance the social-
ism that hinges not on cool understanding but rather on unclear feelings,
that works not with logic but rather with the mysticism of a gospel of
salvation, the socialism that does not proceed from the free will of the
majority of the people but rather from the terrorism of wild fanatics.
(ȀȈȀȈ/ȀȈȇȂ, p.ȁȁȀ)
Mises means that rationalism does reject socialism, yes, but from the
scientific comparison of alternative systems.ŚōŠšŞōŘ Řōţ ōŚŐ ŚōŠšŞōŘ ŞŕœŔŠş
One widely admired doctrine in supposed rivalry with utilitarianism
insists on adherence to natural law and natural rights. Rothbard tries
to derive many detailed propositions about ethics and law from his con-
ception of rights, purportedly derived in turn from John Locke’s axioms
of self-ownership and homesteading (ȀȈȆȂ;ȀȈȇȁ). (Yet even for these he
offers utilitarian arguments, without acknowledging the label.) John J.
Piderit (ȀȈȈȂ), a Georgetown University economist, argues for what he
calls a natural-law approach: correct reason ascertains what actions are
“natural” and therefore ethically acceptable by reflecting on the nature
of human beings, their shared aspirations and fundamental values, and
their interactions in community. Yet Piderit can scarcely mean that what-
ever is natural is right and good. Civilization is largely an exercise in
taming natural behavior. Of course, any acceptable doctrine must con-
form to nature in the sense of not requiring impossible actions or behav-
ior enforceable only at excessive cost. Respecting the facts of nature and
human interaction does not distinguish the natural-law approach from
utilitarianism.
Natural-law doctrine does make sense if it means merely that all sorts
of behavior and precepts, notably including laws made by legislatures and
judges, are open to appraisal on moral grounds. Nothing becomes ethically
acceptable merely by enactment into positive law. Ļat interpretation of
natural law does not rule out a utilitarian grounding of morality. But if the
doctrine says that whatever is morally right (or wrong) has all (or none) of
the force of positive law, it fatuously denies a live distinction.
As for natural (or human or individual) rights, the meaning that seems
to fit the typical context is this: A right is a person’s entitlement to others’
treatment of him that is binding on those others with compelling moral
force. Some rights are positive entitlements, like a child’s right to support