ȃȄȇ Partʺʺ: Politics and PhilosophyJohn Rawls (ȀȈȆȀ), who rejects viewing justice as a mere means to happi-
ness. Other rival doctrines center on duty or religion. Still others posit
conformity to traditional ethical precepts, even if only intuition, rather
than analysis of consequences, has tested the precepts; or respect for indi-
vidual rights that have simply been postulated rather than argued for; or
conduciveness to the special flourishing of the few highest and noblest
specimens of the human race. One might also conceivably make the crite-
rion the happiness not of people in general but of oneself discriminatorily
or of some other specific person or class.
Some of these ostensibly rival doctrines, and perhaps others that do
not now come to mind, may turn out, on examination, not to be truly
rivaldoctrines. Ļe criteria they appeal to either may not be as ultimate as
happiness or may be equivalent to it after all. (In putting forth his axioms
of self-ownership and Lockean homesteading, even Rothbard introduces
utilitarian considerations.) Some of these doctrines, on the other hand,
really are different. Ļeir very existence shows that utilitarianism is not
vacuous. If they are too unattractive to be realistic contenders, that fact
further supports utilitarianism.
঩šŕŠŕśŚŕşř
Ļe most urged alternatives to utilitarianism turn out to be varieties of
intuitionism, which Mises quite properly spoke out against. Let me quote
and paraphrase from hisSocialism.(First I should explain a term that Mises
uses. Eudaemonistic ethics is, loosely speaking, a system that applies the
criterion of happiness.) Philosophers had been arguing about the ultimate
Good for a long time, Mises wrote, before modern investigation settled
it. All the arguments used in favor of an anti-eudaemonistic ethics were
unable to dissociate the concept of Morality from that of Happiness. Ļe
vain efforts of these philosophers
were necessary to expose the problem in all its wide ramifications and
so enable a conclusive solution to be reached.... [T]he tenets of intu-
itionist ethics ... are irreconcilable with scientific method [and] have
been deprived of their very foundations.... [E]udaemonistic ideas lie
concealed in every train of aprioristic-intuitive ethical thought.... Every
ethical system built upon the idea of duty ... is finally obliged to yield so
much to Eudaemonism that its principles can no longer be maintained.
In the same way every single requirement of aprioristic-intuitive ethics
displays ultimately an eudaemonistic character. (ȀȈȁȁ/ȀȈȇȀ, p.Ȃȅǿ)