ŏ Ŕ ō Ŝ Š ő ŞșȞCan a Liberal Be an
Egalitarian?*
An answer to the question posed by my title depends, obviously, on how
its terms are defined.
I shall deny that a liberal can consistently advocate government action
to chop down high incomes or especially favorable opportunities out of
zeal for a closer approach to material equality as a goal in its own right.Ȁ
Instead of using the term “liberal” as it is used in modern American
politics, I use it, as Professor Mises and the “Austrian” and “Chicago” econ-
omists do, in the traditional sense. Liberalism is a doctrine that rejects any
supposed social or national purpose transcending the purposes of indi-
viduals. Instead, it seeks to allow each individual a wide range of free
choice among purposes and pursuits. (While emphasizing the goals of
each individual, it in no way denies the healthy fact that he may largely
relate his own interests and satisfactions to those of many people beyond
himself.) Liberalism calls for preserving, adopting, and devising the social,
political, and economic institutions likeliest to minimize the frictions that
inevitably arise to some extent among the pursuits and the specific free-
doms of different individuals. Yet it cannot give an equal blessing to what-
ever goals individuals might have. Malicious enjoyment of the misfor-
tunes of other people, or envy, or a sheer delight in meddling—all are
hard to square with liberalism. Ļis judgment holds even when such tastes
are gratified through voluntary transactions among all persons concerned.
More about this later.
*FromToward Liberty, vol.ŕŕ, Festschrift for Ludwig von Mises (Menlo Park, Calif.:
Institute for Humane Studies,ȀȈȆȀ),ȃȁȁ–ȃȃǿ. Here, in the article’s title and throughout,
the word “egalitarian” replaces the original “equalitarian.”
ȀI shall obviously be dealing in value judgments. While it is impossible to classify value
judgments scientifically as right or wrong, it is possible to investigate relations among
them, revealing compatibilities and clashes and striving for a consistent and economical
articulation. Showing people that certain of their less fundamental value judgments clash
demonstrates the need for a more careful ranking and articulation of their values.
ȃȅȁ