Chapter Ǵǹ: Can a Liberal Be an Egalitarian? ȃȅȈimplicit redistributionist conception of the State as an agency that, while
not allotting individuals their fates outright, at least takes a decisive hand
in readjusting that allotment. I am rather horrified at the idea of the State
as a dispenser of “justice” in the concrete, material sense, and as a God
that passes judgment on what people deserve and steps in not merely to
allay the unfortunate consequences of bad luck but also to strip people of
the fruits of what it considers too much good luck.
Before returning to the question of equality of opportunity, I shift
now from examining possible strands in a rationale of leveling down to
expressing some actual doubts. A much-discussed problem in political
ethics arises when people who expect material or psychological gain from
redistributionary taxation act as judges in their own cause. By imposing
higher tax rates than they themselves are willing to pay, the majority of
voters ask a rich minority to “work more days out of the year for the govern-
ment” than they themselves are willing to do. As Hayek (ȀȈȅǿ, p.ȂȀȃ) has
said, “Ļat a majority, merely because it is a majority, should be entitled to
apply to a minority a rule which does not apply to itself is an infringement
of a principle much more fundamental than democracy itself, a principle
on which the justification of democracy rests.”Ȇ
Ļis “discrimination” argument infuriates redistributionists, who sus-
pect that its user’s heart is bleeding for people who will have more income
and wealth per head, even after taxes, than their alleged despoilers. Ļe
critic has a hard time proving that his real worry is over the attitude that
might makes right—the sheer might of numerous votes.
Ļe “discrimination” argument would lose much of its force if leveling
down were enacted not merely by an overall majority but also by a major-
ity of even those persons who would have to pay the exceptionally high
tax rates. But then why not rely on voluntary redistribution? One reason,
apparently, is the “public-good” character of redistribution: the typical rich
person might be willing to redistribute only if all other rich persons did the
same; only compulsion could achieve the general redistribution assumed
ȆI am aware that a case of sorts can be made out for redistributive taxation as a
kind of mutual insurance arrangement: not knowing how rich or poor they will be in
the future, individual voters may agree to a scheme that will redistribute income away
from them if they turn out to be rich but in their favor if they turn out to be poor.
One trouble with this argument is that voters do in fact have a pretty good idea of their
current and future positions in the national income distribution. Furthermore, the argu-
ment hardly applies to the philosophy of leveling down for its own sake, leveling car-
ried to the point where additional tax revenue for redistribution to the poor is relatively
insignificant.