Chapter Ǵǹ: Can a Liberal Be an Egalitarian? ȃȆȀno less than a prosperous one; the refurbished ideology denies him the
capacity for freedom unless or until he is also made wealthy.ȇ(ȀȈȃȈ, p.ȇȁ)
In doubting whether the pursuit of material equality will achieve any
of the more decent motives of its proponents, I can quote Frank Knight
on my side:
the significance of consumption itself is largely symbolic; the inequality
which really “hurts” is the unequal distribution of dignity, prestige, and
power. Neither abstract reasoning nor the evidence of experience affords
ground for belief that, given the moral drive toward such values as the
dominant motive in society, democratic political process could fail to
distribute them even more unequally still than does competitive business.
(ȀȈȂȅ, pp.Ȃǿȇ–ȂǿȈ)
Furthermore, pursuit of an unattainable material equality will foster
attitudes and political behavior incompatible with a quasi-equality of a
more human and more nearly attainable type. Ideally, people should not
have to be ranked above or below each other according to the fields in
which their accomplishments lie. Each person should have a chance to
excel insomething, with the different types of excellence regarded as incom-
mensurable. Adventure, scholarship, conviviality, self-effacing service to
mankind—all should be as respectable as the amassing of fortunes. Peo-
ple of modest talents or ambitions who do routine work and content
themselves with inexpensive pleasures should be regarded as contribut-
ing to a desirable diversity in personalities, modes of thinking, and styles
and goals of life. A teacher could continue associating without embar-
rassment with congenial former colleagues or students who had become
business tycoons not because progressive taxation had lopped off their
larger monetary incomes but because scholarly values and monetary val-
ues were regarded as incommensurate but of equal dignity. As Herbert
W. Schneider has noted, the equality of the egalitarians implies measure-
ment; he emphasizes, instead, what he calls “the incommensurability of
human beings” (ȀȈȄȅ, p.ȈȆ; cf. pp.Ȁǿǿ,ȀȀȇ).
“All men are created equal” and statements like that are obviously not
meant literally. Ļey use poetic language legitimate in their contexts. Ļey
are meant as normative prescriptions for social actions and attitudes. Ļey
express disapproval of trying to classify individuals as more or less worthy,
more or less entitled to pursue happiness in their own ways, and more or
ȇMy quoting these passages is not meant as an endorsement of the attitude of “the
true Christian.”