Chapter Ǵǹ: Can a Liberal Be an Egalitarian? ȃȆȄright of the people to vote democracy out and dictatorship in? Such ques-
tions are reminiscent of certain logical paradoxes discussed by Bertrand
Russell and untangled by his distinction between levels of discourse. We
have to be clear whether we are talking “in” or “about” language, “within”
or “about” democracy, “within” or “about” liberalism. An action or policy
that embodies or sanctifies meddlesomeness cannot properly be called lib-
eral merely by postulating that it is freely agreed to, perhaps in some mar-
ket transaction or by some democratic procedure. Liberalism is defined,
instead, by the nature and motivation and probable consequences of poli-
cies and institutions. For the word to have any content, we must recognize
the possibility that people may freely choose the negation of liberalism. To
define liberal policies in terms of negotiating procedures or of degree of
agreement is to empty the word of meaning. Ļe choices that emerge from
political or market processes may quite conceivably not be coherent; they
may not fit in with a coherent picture of the good society. One reason
among many is that the choices may not be sufficiently enlightened.ȈA
decision-making process is no substitute for a social philosophy. If total-
itarianism were adopted by unanimous consent, would this decision be a
liberal one? Of course not, for liberalism values arrangements that enable
individuals to pursue their own diverse ends with a minimum of interfer-
ence with each other.
In conclusion, I recognize that some would-be levelers of income,
wealth, and opportunity are honorable men. Ļey do not believe that
numerical might makes right; they do not want to aggrandize the power
of the State; they do not pander to envy; they do not make money the mea-
sure of all things; they do not savor the prospect of feeling superior to the
losers in a suitably handicapped contest. But in appraising a line of policy,
it is not enough to satisfy oneself about the motives of the more honor-
able among its proponents; one must also consider what type of society it
tends to promote. One must consider that a policy may exert some of its
effects over a long period of time through its influence on what attitudes
prevail. If I am a good judge of my own motives, I oppose fiscal leveling
because I want the kind of society that respects but puts no special empha-
sis on material values, one that allows niches for people with diverse drives
and goals in life, one characterized by tolerant attitudes, and one whose
ȈĻis is one among many reasons for rejecting the currently fashionable concept of
“Pareto optimality” as a touchstone for economic policy. Ļere is no substitute for consid-
ering how the probable consequences of each contemplated policy will mesh or will clash
with one’s conception of a good society.