Chapter ǴǺ: Rights, Contract, and Utility in Policy Espousal ȃȇȄarrangements over others? On what basis can a social philosopher hope to
distinguish between laws or constitutions that could and those that could
not have been agreed upon under either actual or idealized conditions?
Ļe only plausible basis, I submit, is that people stripped of narrow self-
interest would consider the preferred arrangements as coming closer to an
impartial conception of the good society, that is, as being more conducive
to happiness, than the alternatives. A contractarian might say: No; impar-
tial people would prefer those arrangements because they werefair. But
why is fairness so desirable? Either because it just is, because a compelling
intuition insists on it, because the question is not further discussable; or
else because people’s treating each other fairly is conducive to their effec-
tive pursuit of happiness.
I assert not that contractarianism is flatly wrong but that it disguises its
affinities with utilitarianism by repulsive and unnecessary fictions (about
which I shall have more to say).
ŠŔő ōŠŠōŏŗ śŚ“ŠŞšŠŔ ŖšŐœřőŚŠ”
Yet Buchanan sharply contrasts his contractarian vision with the “truth-
judgment” approach, as he disparagingly labels a position akin to the util-
itarianism defended here. Ļis scorned approach tends to “assume that
there is a unique explanation, a unique set of rules which defines the ele-
ments of a good society and which, once discovered, will come to be gen-
erally accepted by informed and intellectually honest men” (ȀȈȆȆ, p.ȆȄ; the
words quoted occur in interrogative sentences, but the context leaves little
doubt that Buchanan is characterizing the approach he condemns).
Buchanan distinguishes further between his own approach and its rival.
His contractarian conception is analogous to market activity, a search for
agreement to the mutual benefit of the participants. Ļe truth-judgment
approach is analogous to the deliberations of a jury (ȀȈȇȃ, pp.ȁȈ–Ȃǿ). Ear-
lier (ȀȈȆȄa, p.Ȁȅȃ) he had distinguished, similarly, between the politician
and the judge. Ļe politician seeks consensus and acceptable compromises.
He is not engaged in a search for some one “true” judgment, and he is not
properly behaving if he seeks to further some well-defined ideal drawn
from the brains of his academic mentors. Ļe judge is in a distinctly
different position. He does seek “truth,” not compromise.As applied to politics, Buchanan deplores the judge or jury conception.
It conduces to intolerance by those who think they have attained political